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ABSTRACT
We consider the problem of detecting clones in wireless mobile ad-
hoc networks. We assume that one of the devices of the network
has been cloned. Everything, including certificates and secret keys.
This can happen quite easily, because of a virus that immediately
after sending all the content of the infected device to the adversary
destroys itself, or just because the owner has left his device unat-
tended for a few minutes in a hostile environment. The problem
is to detect this attack. We propose a solution in networks of mo-
bile devices carried by individuals. These networks are composed
by nodes that have the capability of using short-range communica-
tion technology like blue-tooth or Wi-Fi, where nodes are carried
by mobile users, and where links appear and disappear according
to the social relationships between the users. Our idea is to use
social physical contacts, securely collected by wireless personal
smart-phones, as a biometric way to authenticate the legitimate
owner of the device and detect the clone attack. We introduce two
mechanisms: Personal Marks and Community Certificates. Per-
sonal Marks is a simple cryptographic protocol that works very well
when the adversary is an insider, a malicious node in the network
that is part, or not very far, from the social community of the origi-
nal device that has been cloned. Community Certificates work very
well when the adversary is an outsider, a node that has the goal of
using the stolen credentials when interacting with other nodes that
are far in the social network from the original device. When com-
bined, these mechanisms provide an excellent protection against
this very strong attack. We prove our ideas and solutions with ex-
tensive simulations in a real world scenario—with mobility traces
collected in a real life experiment.
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1. INTRODUCTION
You have left your smartphone on the table at a cafeteria. You
soon realize and go back to take it. Fortunately, it is still there!
You feel safe—while you are not safe at all. An adversary has con-
nected your smartphone to a laptop and dumped all of its memory,
including public and secret cryptographic keys. It is a matter of sec-
onds or, at most, minutes. You don’t revoke your certificates (you
feel safe!) and, a month later, you discover that your credentials
have been used by someone else. If you think this cannot happen—
people take very good care of their personal devices—consider that
according to a fairly recent report (WTOP, 15 Nov 2006) 478 lap-
tops have been lost or stolen from the IRS (the Internal Revenue
Service is the United States federal government agency that collects
taxes and enforces the internal revenue laws) between 2002–2006;
112 held sensitive taxpayer data, including SSNs.
Portable personal devices—smart-phones, laptops, and PDAs—
are more and more used in our everyday life. We use them to make
phone calls, to plan our activities, to surf the web, to manage our
banking account, and probably very soon to make purchases. The
system we consider is a network of personal smart-phones that con-
nects to each other by using short-range communication technol-
ogy like blue-tooth. The nodes are the devices and the links ap-
pear and disappear as people move and get in physical touch. As a
consequence, the network is not a collection of randomly moving
objects—it has a social structure that can be exploited to deliver
revolutionary applications, and, we believe, new and surprisingly
effective solutions to classical networking and security problems.
These networks have been called with several different names—
pocket switched networks [20, 8], mobile social networks, oppor-
tunistic mobile ad-hoc networks, among others—and have drawn
the attention of many researchers in the community. Most of the
work has focused on forwarding, that is how to route messages in
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such a way to deliver them as quickly as possible and as cheaply as
possible to destination. Here, we focus on security. The attack that
we have described in the first rows of this paper is the clone attack.
The clone attack might as well be performed by a virus that infects
our device and sends all the data, including secret keys associated
with the certificates, to the adversary. So, you are not safe even
though you never forget your smart-phone at the coffee shop. In
this paper we are looking for a solution to this problem. Of course,
we do not want one that consists in typing a password every time
we use our certificates. People don’t like passwords and tend to
forget them, or, even worse, choose trivial ones.
Our idea is to use social physical contacts, securely collected by
wireless personal smart-phones, as a biometric way to authenticate
the owner of the device. Indeed, our social physical contacts—our
family members, the same barman everyday at the coffee shop, our
colleagues at work, our old friends when we hang out and relax
after work—characterize ourselves in a distinctive way. Of course,
each day is somewhat different and we don’t always meet the same
people, but surely there is a strong regularity in the communities we
live in and in circle of friends that we usually meet in person. We
will see how to use this regularity, complemented with other essen-
tial mechanisms, to detect the clone attack in wireless networks of
smart-phones or other personal devices and to prevent the misuse
of stolen certificates.
In this paper we introduce two protocols: Personal Marks and
Community Certificates. Personal Marks is a simple cryptographic
protocol that proves to be an excellent way to detect the attack when
the adversary is an insider, a person that belongs to the same com-
munity of the victim. Community Certificate is a solution based on
certificates that tells how the node is expected to behave in terms of
social contacts. If the clone is an outsider, a node that behaves in a
different way with respect to the victim and meets different nodes
and different communities, then Community Certificate works very
well, the certificate soon expires, and the clone cannot authenticate
any more to the other nodes of the network. The two protocols
are meant to be used at the same time and, according to a large
set of experiments made with well-known traces of human contacts
computed during real life experiments, they collectively prove to
protect the nodes against the clone attack in an excellent way.
2. RELATED WORK
The detection of the clone attack is one of the most investigated
security issue in wireless ad-hoc networks. As far as static wire-
less networks are concerned, there are three main approaches to
the problem: Centralized, local and distributed random based tech-
niques. The centralized techniques [19, 4] require nodes to send
either location information or key information along with the node
ID to a base station which in turn processes the information re-
ceived and, in case of anomalies (same node ID with different lo-
cations), trigger a revocation procedure. Aside from presenting a
single point of failure (the base station), this approach has the draw-
back of incurring high communication cost to the network due to
the high number of messages involved.
Local-based schemes [9, 16, 19, 23] make use of voting mecha-
nisms within nodes’ neighborhoods to detect clones. Though they
don’t suffer from the drawbacks of the central based schemes, they
fail on detecting replication attacks where node clones are scattered
in different areas of the network.
The distributed and random based techniques [35, 14, 13, 40]
require nodes to send signed location information to randomly se-
lected destinations on the network in a hop-by-hop fashion. These
schemes rely on the high probability of intersection of different
location-declaration routing paths started from replicas of the same
node. The nodes on which such intersection occurs are called wit-
nesses, and their task is to then trigger node revocation procedures.
Another distributed scheme [11] uses a random value, distributed
to the nodes by the base station, to generate independent clusters
in the network. Each cluster is an Exclusive Subset Maximal Inde-
pendent Set (ESMIS) and has a cluster head denoted with SLDRs.
One or more trees (whose nodes correspond to SLDRs) are defined
over the network graph, and bottom-up aggregation protocols on
such trees are used to detect node replicas (that are present in more
than one ESMIS).
Although these distributed techniques do not present single points
of failure, the overhead they incur either in message traffic or in
computational terms [11] is far from negligible. Moreover, all the
aforementioned techniques, by relying on fixed geographical posi-
tion of the nodes in the network are not apt to be used in mobile
scenarios such the one we consider [20, 8].
With the increasing use of cellular technology, cloning of mo-
bile devices for the purpose of making fraudulent telephone calls
become a real threat to phone carriers. While this was a real threat
in the nineties when CDMA was adopted [36], in the GSM era it
started to be considered as a minor/non feasible attack, at least for
fraudulent billing purposes. With the spreading of the mobile pay
systems (72.8 million of users at the end of 2009, expected 220
million by 2011 in China only [33]), and especially those based on
credit card transactions, phone cloning has become a vicious threat
to the users portfolio [37]. Thus a lot of research on detecting such
attacks have been done, most of which is based on the use of neural
networks by the carrier to detect possible anomalies. For a good
survey see [10].
The idea of exploiting information regarding social ties between
nodes is not new, actually it is common to a good part of the lit-
erature on pocket switched networks (PSN) and similar social net-
works. Much research has been dedicated to the analysis of the
data collected during real-life experiments, to compute statistical
properties of human mobility, and to uncover its structure in sub-
communities [38, 20, 8, 24, 7, 5, 6]. Later on, most of the work in
the field focused on message forwarding and to find the best strat-
egy to relay messages in order to route them to destination as fast
as possible (see [15, 21, 18], among many others). Also security
problematics such as node capture [12] or selfishness [28, 32] have
been solved by making use of social relationships among nodes.
Biometrics have been used for centuries to authenticate people.
The most common example of biometrics is the handwritten signa-
ture that we use everyday to certify our identity. With technologi-
cal development, the use of biometrics to authenticate has become
a well-known area of investigation in computer security. Several
biological measurements have been used to identify people to com-
puter systems: voice, face, iris, keystroke dynamics (the way we
type is often sufficiently unique to identify ourselves), and others.
In many cases these are not fully automatic. With keystroke dynam-
ics, for example, the user has to type. As an excellent reference and
starting point on computer biometrics, see [2].
The authors in [1] propose two intrusion detection systems that
have similar biometrics ideas: The first one is build upon Radio
Frequency Fingerprinting (RFF), whereas the second one leverages
User Mobility Profiles (UMP). However both detection systems are
centralized, and rely on the fact that the intruder (the clone) behaves
substantially differently from the real user in terms of geographical
movements. Thus, compared with the solutions proposed in this
paper, both systems are based on a completely different idea and
are not able to detect anomalies when the clone behaves similarly
to the original node (for example, when the clone attack happens in
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a building). Lastly, the solutions are not distributed.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that presents
biometric authentication techniques based on the social contacts
of the owner or the device to detect the clone attack in mobile
wireless networks of smart-phones. The techniques, namely Com-
munity Certificates and Personal Marks, are only build upon the
social-guided meeting patterns of users in the mobile social net-
work. They are thoroughly orthogonal to trust or voting mecha-
nisms, or geography based techniques to detect cellphone theft or
credit card fraud, that are based on different ideas and can be used
at the same time.
3. THE SYSTEM
Our network setting is made of last generation smart-phones.
These devices are more and more popular—we can easily envision
a society in which almost everybody will carry a personal comput-
ing device of this kind. Commercial smart-phones are usually able
to communicate by using short-range communication technology,
like blue-tooth and/or Wi-Fi, aside classic GSM. When two peo-
ple meet, their personal devices establish a link by using one of
the above mentioned short-range technologies. In the network we
consider, nodes are devices carried by people, and links appear and
disappear as people move and meet.
Smart-phones are not-so-small devices that can easily handle
video/audio streaming, 3D games, web surfing and SSL sessions,
and other applications. Therefore, we can safely assume that nodes
are able to perform public key cryptography that is used to sign
messages and to establish secure communication sessions among
peers. The nodes are equipped with public/private key pairs, and
the former is signed by a trusted authority CA. We assume that
our protocols execute by setting up authenticated and encrypted
sessions among the peers. Nodes are loosely time synchronized.
Loose time synchronization is very easy to get, if a precision in
the order of the second is enough, like in our protocols. We also
assume that the trusted authority is able to send a message to any
node in the system, for example using the cellular network. When
a clone is present, the message is received by the original node and
by the clone as well (of course it is perfectly possible that the clone
has turned off its interface to the cellular network).
Our protocols rely on authenticated logs of physical contacts be-
tween devices. However, if not carefully implemented, these logs
can be attacked. We assume that the nodes use techniques like
distance bounding [3, 39] to guarantee that the log of a contact
between two devices can be collected only when the devices are
provably in physical proximity. These mechanisms are based on
measuring the delay in the communication.
Lastly, we assume that the users have access to an alternative
way to authenticate to the authority. There are several examples
of such mechanisms. One example is GMail: If you forget your
password, you can still authenticate by responding to a list of per-
sonal questions that, most probably, only you can respond. In other
systems, you might be able to authenticate by using a smart-card at
your desktop at home. Another example is the pair of PIN and PUK
codes used in cellular phones, the first one is short and easy to type,
the second one longer, more tedious, and is meant to be used only
to recover from PIN blocking or other uncommon events. In any
case, we assume that the alternative mechanism to authenticate is
secure but long, burdensome, and we definitely want to use it only
in rare and exceptional circumstances like when we need to recover
from a clone attack.
In the rest of this paper, we use 〈m〉i to denote a message m
signed by node i.
3.1 The Adversary and the Problem
We consider the following scenario: A smart-phone is infected
by a worm or by a virus. The goal of the virus is to make a perfect
copy of the device of the victim, to send all the data to the adver-
sary’s device, and to destroy itself without leaving any trace. A
similar attack can be performed in a different way: You left your
device unattended for just a couple of minutes; when you go back
to take it, it is still there. What you don’t know is that the adversary
has made a clone by copying all the memory of your device.
Later on, the clone can be used to interact in the network by us-
ing the victim’s credentials. Note that everything has been cloned,
including certificates and secret keys. We assume that the clone can
be switched off arbitrarily by the adversary to prevent detection—
the device might be turned on only when necessary (that is, when it
is used to connect to the other peers in the network with the stolen
credentials). To start with, we assume that the adversary has been
able to clone only one device. Later in the paper we will discuss
what is going to happen if more devices can be stolen.
Our goal is to build a system able to detect and/or stop as fast as
possible and as accurately as possible this attack.
4. DETECTION OF THE CLONE ATTACK
The users of our system are humans—their mobility pattern, the
people they meet, and the places they visit are not random. Rather,
the dynamics of the network is highly influenced by the fact that
almost everything in our everyday life is guided by social relation-
ships (e.g. friends, family) and interests (e.g. work, school, gym,
or playing chess). If we think of our daytime, it usually follows a
do-repeat cycle that might look like this: Go to work (or school);
meet with colleagues; finish work and go out with the same old
friends or do whatever we like to do during our free time; go back
home; go to work again and so on. Of course, it is not always like
that (fortunately), but surely there is a regularity in the things we
do and the people we meet. The same cycle is performed by our
mobile device, and the ones of our friends, family members, or col-
leagues that we meet over and over again. The people (devices) we
meet everyday characterize ourselves in a remarkably distinctive
way. One of the ideas in this paper is to use this characterization
as efficiently as possible in order to make nodes prove who they
are not with something they know (passwords), or something they
have (certificate), but with the proof that they actually meet physi-
cally and regularly the people they are supposed to meet.
4.1 Personal Marks
We start by introducing Personal Marks. Personal Marks is a
very simple cryptographic protocol we can use to distinguish clones.
Actually, Personal Marks is able to tell you that the person that you
have before is not the same person that you met last time, though it
can’t really tell who is the impostor.
Let’s make a step back and proceed more formally. Personal
Marks consists in marking each node in your community with a
small cryptographic object, signed by yourself, that you can check
to have some level of guarantee that node j is exactly the same
node j you have met earlier. First of all, we call community of
node i its set of friends—the set of other nodes that gets frequently
in physical contact with node i. One way to compute the com-
munity of node i is by using the distributed community detection
algorithm described in [22]. Communities are a fundamental no-
tion in social networks, people meet more often other people of the
same communities and this intuitive property have been leveraged
in the literature in several ways.
Personal Marks works as follows: When two nodes of the same
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i
ri−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ j (1)
i
〈MARK,t,ri,r j〉 j←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− j (2)
i
〈MARK,t,ri,r j〉i−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ j (3)
i
〈OK〉←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− j (4)
Both nodes i and j store the mark. (5)
Figure 1: Mark update protocol. Here we assume IDi < ID j.
community i and j meet, they both put a mark on the other device.
The mark that node i gives to node j contains a timestamp signed
by node i itself. Same is done by node j and given to node i. The
next time they meet, they both request the mark to check it before
starting the new session.
If there is an clone present in the community, say a clone j′ of
original node j, and j′ gets in touch with the community of j, Per-
sonal Marks is going to detect the anomaly.
Assume that node j has been cloned at time t0 and that node i gets
in physical contact with node j for the first time after the attack at
time t1 > t0. Clearly, node i does not know if the node is the original
or the clone and, by using Personal Marks, it freshens the mark with
the node. The detection is triggered when node i meets the other
node, that cannot help but exchanging the old version of the mark,
a mark with a timestamp in the interval (−∞, t0) that does not pass
the test by node i. If the adversary is an insider, node i will soon
meet both the nodes, the clone and the original one (that is a friend).
While node i is not able to tell who is the original node and who
is the impostor, the clone attack is detected and node j is revoked
by the authority. The legitimate node j has now to go through an
alternative, longer procedure to re-authenticate.
4.1.1 Personal Marks: The Check and the Update
Protocols
In our system, a personal mark is a small cryptographic object
that carries some randomness from both peers. The authentication
protocol in Personal Marks is made of two parts: The mark-check,
and the mark-exchange. Let us start from the mark-exchange pro-
tocol. Each time two nodes i and j meet, they contribute some
randomness ri and r j to freshen the mark (or to establish one if
this is the first time the nodes meet). The mark is of the form
〈MARK, t,ri,r j〉, where t is a timestamp (the timestamp is not cru-
cial for the system to work, but it gives information about the timing
of the attack in case of detection). The mark is signed and stored by
both peers. Note that, if the protocol is not completed (may be for
lack of continuos connectivity), the peers can safely assume that it
has not happened.
Let us now look at the mark-check protocol, executed before the
mark-exchange protocol when it is not the first time that nodes i
and j meet. Suppose, without loss of generality, that first node i
checks node j and then node j checks node i. Node i sends a request
to which j has to reply with the last version of the mark. After
receiving the mark from j, i checks the signature and the timestamp
and notifies node j. In the case when the test is failed, both the
correct mark and the mark exchanged during this protocol can be
sent to the authority by using GSM or broadcast in the network
as a proof of the clone attack, and the credentials of node j are
thus revoked. Of course, the legitimate node j is also invited to
re-authenticate and get new credentials.
i
〈MARK_RQST〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ j (6)
i
〈MARK_RPL,m〉←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− j (7)
i
〈MARKCHECK_OK〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ j
or (8)
i
〈MARKCHECK_FAILED〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ j
Figure 2: Mark check protocol. Here CA denotes the trusted
authority.
Note that if a clone refuses to initiate or to complete either of
the two protocols with the goal of avoiding detection, then it does
not authenticate and its cloned certificates are going to expire soon
thanks to Community Certificates, the other mechanism we pro-
pose in this paper that works very well when the adversary does
not meet the members of the communities of the original owner.
4.1.2 Personal Marks, Insiders, and Outsiders
Personal Marks works on the assumption that both the clone and
the original node get in touch with a common node in the commu-
nity of the original node, sooner or later. This is often true—the
adversary is someone that is part of the same community of the
victim: A colleague at workplace, or a fellow student at college. In
this case, we will say that the adversary is an insider, and Personal
Marks works extremely well as shown later in the experiments with
real mobility traces.
However, this is not always the case. It is perfectly possible that
the clone uses the credentials that it has stolen far from the com-
munities of the original node in the network. In this case, we will
call the adversary an outsider. This is also a very important sce-
nario, in many real cases the attack can be performed by someone
that we don’t know and that has the goal of taking our device to
a different city or in a different part of the same city and use the
credentials when needed. Clearly, Personal Marks can’t do much
against outsiders. Outsiders never meet someone from the commu-
nity of the victim. Therefore, they are never checked and they don’t
need any fresh mark. To fight back outsiders, we have to develop a
completely new mechanism.
4.2 Community Certificates
When a node, say node i, agrees to enter the system, it auto-
matically enters a training period during which it securely collects
signed and timestamped logs of the physical contacts with other
nodes. At the end of the period the logs are reported to the author-
ity. The authority uses the logs to build a signed certificate ComCi
that is sent back to node i. Clearly, all these messages are encrypted
and authenticated, like all sessions in our protocols. The certificate
is of the form ComCi = 〈〈FSi,FIi,ki〉CA,SUi〉. In the certificate,
FSi is the set of “best friends” of node i (its community); FIi is a
mapping that tells the “strength of the relationship” between node i
and his best friends. More specifically, for every j ∈ FSi, FIi( j) is
a value computed as a monotone function of the inter-contact times
between nodes i and j observed during the training period. More-
over, for every j ∈ FSi, SUi( j) is a timestamp signed by node j
that certifies at what time there has been the last contact between
node i and j (this object is similar to the mark in Personal Marks).
Given node j ∈ FSi, we say that the timestamp SUi( j) is fresh if
t < SUi( j)+FIi( j). Certificate ComCi = 〈〈FSi,FIi,k〉CA,SUi〉 is
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i
〈AUTH_RQST〉←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− E (9)
i
〈AUTH_RPL,ComCi〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ E (10)
i
〈AUTH_OK〉←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− E
or (11)
i
〈AUTH_DENIED〉←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− E
Figure 3: Community-Authentication protocol: Node i authen-
ticates to entity E (either a node or a resource like an ATM
machine/card reader etc.).
valid at time t if and only if at least k signed timestamps in set SUi
are fresh. In other words, the certificate is valid only if the node has
been able to collect enough fresh signatures by physically meeting
people in his circle of friends. When the authority generates the
certificate, SUi can be prepared with timestamps signed by the au-
thority, just to make the certificate immediately valid.
Note that all this process is totally automatic. Note as well that
we assume that no attack occurs during the training period. This is
quite reasonable indeed, if such an attack takes place, the authority
would receive training logs from both the victim and the clone at
the same time, thus revealing the attack.
4.2.1 Community Certificates and Outsiders
The community certificate is a requirement for the authentication
of node i to the other peers of the system. Indeed, when i meets an-
other node, say node j, it is required to show the certificate ComCi
in case it is willing to set up a communication or to use one of the
services provided by node j. The simple protocol is described in
Figure 3.
As mentioned, an adversary that has the goal of using the cloned
smart-phone outside the communities of the legitimate owner is an
outsider. Community Certificates proves to be an excellent mecha-
nism to stop clone attacks by outsiders. Indeed, when taken outside
the communities of the owner, the certificate expires soon. The ad-
versary is simply not able to collect enough fresh signatures to keep
the certificate valid.
In the experiments with real traces, we show that it is possible
to choose FSi, FIi, and k in such a way that the certificates are
continuously and consistently valid, when carried by the legitimate
owner, and expire quickly when carried by outsiders. Therefore,
a combined use of Community Certificates and Personal Marks is
an excellent way to provide efficient and secure authentication and
to thwart the clone attack in mobile wireless networks of smart-
phones. In Section 6 we discuss a few ideas, add-ons, and solutions
to extend the features of Community Certificates and to deal with
non-frequent scenarios like the case when the legitimate owner has
to use his own community certificate during a long travel far from
his usual communities.
4.2.2 Dynamic Community Certificates
So far, we have described Community Certificates as a static
system. However, in real life it may be possible, even if it is not
common, that we change our own community. In general, it is
reasonable to imagine the following scenarios: (i) our community
changes completely since, for example, we move to another town;
and (ii) one of our friends moves away, or a new node is our new
best friend. Here, we see that it is easy to design protocols to dy-
namically change the community certificate in a secure way.
In case (i), it is enough to start off a new training phase and to get
a new certificate. In case (ii), we can initiate a selective update of
the certificate to remove one node, or to add a new one, or to update
the parameter of a node that is already part of our ring. Of course,
the addition and/or the removal can change all the parameters of
the certificate, like mapping FIi or ki. The procedure can be easily
secured. Indeed, when the procedure starts, the authority sends a
GSM message to the node. If a clone requests the procedure to
change the certificate according to his own communities, than the
message is received by the original owner as well, that promptly
detects the attack and sends to the authority a signed request of
certificate revocation.
4.3 Multiple, Coordinated Clone Attacks
In this paper, we consider the problem of detecting a single clone
attack. Generally speaking, if the adversary is very powerful, it is
however possible that it clones a whole set of mobile nodes. While
we don’t explicitly deal with this case in this work, it is still useful
to see what is going to happen with Personal Marks and Commu-
nity Certificates.
What we can say is that Personal Marks keeps working with (ap-
proximately) the same performance. According to our experiments,
communities are not closed sets of nodes. Usually nodes belong
to many different communities and the structure of the network is
characterized by many overlapping communities. This is in accor-
dance with other well-known research work in the literature [34].
In other words, it is usually impossible to select a small commu-
nity of nodes that have very little contacts with nodes outside the
community (of course, if you can select the whole network than
it is easy, but if the adversary is able to clone the whole network
that there is little we can do about it). Therefore, Personal Marks
is still efficient in detecting the attack, thanks to all the interactions
between the nodes of the cloned community with nodes outside the
community.
A similar argument is true for Community Certificates—it is usu-
ally impossible to isolate a small community whose nodes do not
have nodes that are outside the community in the certificate. How-
ever, it is in principle possible to isolate and clone a community in
such a way that the cloned devices can authenticate each other. To
make this attack possible only if the community to be cloned is very
big, parameter k must be set high enough, and certificates should
be computed in such a way not to form cliques. While this is out
of the scope of this paper, it is certainly a open and interesting re-
search direction. In any case, that means that the adversary is able
to hijack a whole community. Moreover, we will see how to extend
Community Certificate by admitting fixed devices in the certificate.
For example, a fixed infrastructure in both our home and our office.
While cloning a device can be easy, stealing a fixed infrastructure
can be considerably harder.
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present some experimental results in order
to show the detection performances of our system. The results re-
fer to the two typologies of attack we consider: Insiders and out-
siders. In the first case the detection relies on the Personal Marks
sub-system. Rather, in the second, the Community Certificates sub-
system comes into play and the detection is determined by the ex-
piring time of the certificate when in the hand of the adversary. We
start off by giving detailed information on the dataset we used to
evaluate our protocol. Then we present the results obtained with
Personal Marks and with Community Certificates.
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Table 1: Details on the datasets (DS) and respective training period (TR).
Data set Dartmouth UCSD Reality SWIM
Total nodes 1101 32 45 1500
DS AVG active/day 1034 27 37 1500
TR AVG active/day 980 28 38 1500
DS AVG contacts/node/day 283 49 15 132
TR AVG contacts/node/day 263 51 16 131
DS AVG stability/node/week 0.55 0.52 0.55 0.49
5.1 Datasets
All the experiments have been performed by using a simula-
tor driven by three type of traces: WLAN (real), bluetooth (real),
and simulated traces. For the WLAN traces we used the Dart-
mouth [26] and UCSD [29] datasets. The bluetooth trace we used
is the Reality [17], collected during the Reality Mining project at
the MIT Media Lab. Finally, the simulated trace has ben generated
using the SWIM [31] model.
In contrast with the simulated scenario, in which we have been
able to select the number of nodes and the length of the experiment,
in the case of WLAN and bluetooth traces we had to select a period
of time reasonably long that contained a set of nodes that are fairly
active. The reason is that real traces often suffer from data loss
and contain nodes whose activity is recorded only for a portion of
the total time span covered by the trace. This might cause loss of
performance of our system.
5.1.1 Dartmouth
The Dartmouth trace consists of the SMNP logs of the access
points across the Dartmouth College campus from April 2001 to
June 2004. To infer the contacts between the nodes we follow the
assumption widely used in the literature that two nodes are able
to communicate to each other whenever they are associated to the
same access point ([30] [8]). From this trace we have selected a
time span of 8 weeks, from January 5, 2004 to March 1, 2004,
during which a set of 1101 nodes have recored to have at least 50
contacts a day for at least the 80% of the days. This ensures us that
these nodes stay active during the whole period we used to evaluate
our protocol.
5.1.2 UCSD
The UCSD trace is part of the Wireless Topology Discover project
(WTD) [29]. The trace consists of the logs extracted from PDA
carried by a set of about 275 freshmen students of the University of
California, in San Diego. The trace spans a period of 11 weeks be-
tween Semptember 22, 2002 and December 8, 2002, during which
each PDA periodically recorded the signal strength of all the APs
in its range. To infer the contacts between the nodes we again used
the assumption that two nodes can communicate as long as they are
in the range of a the same access point. As also reported in [30],
we have found that the trace is characterized by a steady decline of
the user population that especially affects the last two weeks. For
this reason we decided to restrict our tests to the first 8 weeks and
to use only the set of 32 nodes that recorded at least 1 contact a day
for at least the 80% of the days.
5.1.3 Reality
As opposed to the Dartmouth and UCSD traces that used WiFi
radio logs, the Reality trace has been collected using short ranged
bluetooth radios. More in detail, the trace included the bluetooth
records collected by 94 cellphones distributed to student and fac-
ulty on the MIT campus during 9 months (from September 2004 to
June 2005). We have chosen this particular trace since it is one of
the few existing traces which encompasses a large number of nodes
communicating through bluetooth technology for a long period of
time. Like other traces, however, many nodes recorded very few
to no sightseeings for long periods of time. In order to keep the
amount of nodes high we thus restricted ourselves to a period of 8
weeks going from October 18th to December 13th 2004 and dis-
carded the nodes that didn’t record at least 1 contact a day for at
least the 70% of the days. This selection yielded a final set of 45
nodes.
5.1.4 SWIM
This trace has been generated using the SWIM model ([31]) that
has been shown to simulate well human mobility in conference and
university campus environments. The SWIM simulator has also
been shown [25] to be able to properly scale a reference scenario
by keeping the nodes density constant. Thanks to this we have been
able to replicate the statistical and social properties of the Cam-
bridge Campus bluetooth data set [27] (that is only 11 days long)
increasing both the number of nodes and the time span by keeping
the same dynamics of the original real trace in terms of average
number of contacts per user: The generated trace contains 1500
nodes and is 8 weeks long. Since the simulator keeps track of all
the contacts between the nodes, it hasn’t been necessary to prepro-
cess the trace and we’ve been able to use the whole set of nodes.
5.2 Training Period
As we already discussed in the section 4.2, before a node can
use Community Certificates, it is required to go trough a training
period during which it collects logs of contacts. At the same time,
the Personal Marks system described in Section 4.1 assumes that
each node know its community. For this reason we decided to split
all the traces in two parts: the former used as a training period for
all the nodes, the latter used to test the performances of our pro-
tocols. During the training period, we both collect data about the
contacts between the nodes needed by the community certificates
and extract the communities of the nodes. For this, we use the k-
clique algorithm [34], one of the most popular in the area of social
mobile networking ([20, 22, 21, 25]), of which there is a distributed
version ([22]).
Since the movement of people is usually characterized by a high
degree of regularity, we have seen that it is not necessary that the
training period be long: In every trace we used a training period
consisting of only the initial 25% of the total time span of the trace.
This is enough for our system to quickly detect both insiders and
outsiders. A further evidence that our intuition is good is given by
the results shown in Table 1, where it can be seen that the properties
of the trace during the training period are very close to those of the
rest of the trace. In particular, the last row of the table shows what
we have called the average stability of the nodes. We defined the
stability of a node x as a measure of the average similarity between
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the set of nodes x met during the training period and those it met
during each week of the rest of the trace. More in detail, if T is the
set of nodes that x met during the training period and Si is the set of
nodes that x met during the i-th week of the trace, the stability of x
is computed as
1
n
n
∑
i=1
|Si∩T |
|T |
where n is the number of weeks of the trace (training period ex-
cluded). As shown in the table, the average stability of the nodes is
always close or greater than 0.5 meaning that, on average, a node
meets every week at least half of the nodes it met during the training
period.
5.3 Communities
In this section we briefly give details about the communities
found in the various traces. To use the k-cliques community de-
tection algorithm we first had to extract a social graph from the
contacts happening in the training period of each trace. We put the
edges in the graphs in such a way that they reflect the repetitive
social behaviour of the nodes. Since all the not-simulated traces
we used have been collected in university campuses, we expect the
social connectivity to be given by students that, for example, fre-
quent the same classes, study in the same library or live in the same
dormitory. Once the social graph is built, the k-cliques community
detection algorithm is run over it in order to find groups of nodes
socially close to each other. However, it is important to note that
according to the experiments our protocols are pretty robust with
respect to different definitions of “friend” used in the literature, as
long as it is true that friends meet regularly and frequently.
5.4 Personal Marks vs Insiders
To test the performance of Personal Marks, we run a trace-driven
simulation where we make each pair of nodes of the same commu-
nity check and exchange marks each time they meet.
In order to simulate the attack, for every node i we do the fol-
lowing: For every node j in the community of node i we generate
a clone attack of node j against node i (node j is the insider) and
measure the time required by Personal Marks to detect the attack.
Performing the experiment is rather straightforward. As we de-
scribed in Section 4.1, a node in the victim’s community detects
the attack in two cases: The first case is when the node first meets
the adversary and then the victim, the second case is when the node
first meets the victim and then the adversary. In the first case, the
mark of the victim node will be found to be outdated, while, in the
second case, it is the mark of the adversary that will be found to
be outdated. Thus, we measure the average time it takes for any of
these two cases to happen after the attack happened.
Figure 4 shows the performance the Personal Marks sub-system
on all the traces—real and synthetic ones. We show, for a given
number of days x, what is the number of nodes for which the de-
tection of the attack takes more than x days on average. First, we
can notice from the results that, consistently in all the traces, the
time needed to detect an insider is very low. Indeed, in the majority
of the cases the attack is detected in one day, one day and a half
at most. More in detail, in the Dartmouth trace (Figure 4(a)), the
attack gets detected in less than one day in the 84% of the cases
and in less than two days in the 96% of the cases. In the UCSD
trace the attack is detected in less than one day in the 44% of the
cases, but for the 97% of the cases it takes less than two days. In
the Reality trace (Figure 4(c)) the performance of Personal Marks
is slightly worse: In the 69.5% of the cases the attack is detected in
less than one day and a half, while it takes less than three days for
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Figure 4: Distribution of the average detection time of insiders
the 93.4% of the cases. The reason why it takes more time to detect
the attack is that the Reality trace is considerably sparser than the
other traces. Indeed, Table 1 shows that the average number of con-
tacts is the minimum among all the traces. Lastly, Personal Marks
shows the best performances in the SWIM trace (Figure 4(d)): In
the 86.5% of the cases, the nodes need at most half a day to de-
tect the attack, while in the 99% of the cases it takes at most one
day and a half. This is not surprising. In the real traces, in fact,
all the nodes have periods of time (that can last even a few days)
where they didn’t report any contact. Of course, this is not very
realistic—all of the traces capture only a very small fraction of the
real contacts of the user (the other people in the experiment, often a
small subset of the other students at school). We expect that, in case
of wide deployment in the real world, the number of contacts would
be much higher than any of these traces—both real and synthetic
ones—and the performance, already good, would greatly improved
even compared to the synthetic traces, that have been designed to
mimic the dynamics of the Cambridge traces.
5.5 Community Certificates vs Outsiders
The Community Certificate sub-system has the goal to fight back
outsiders. This sub-system has three main components: Set FSi of
nodes appearing in the certificate of node i, the values in FIi, and
parameter ki.
Let us concentrate on FSi and FIi. The first one is the set of nodes
from which node i receives the signed timestamps it uses to prove
its identity. The second one defines for how long a signed times-
tamp given to i by j is fresh (see Section 4.2). Clearly, the correct
definition of FSi and FIi is crucial. For instance, if the set FSi were
large and the values FIi( j) for every j in FSi were big, then it would
be easy for node i to prove its identity. In fact, the probability that
node i meets at least ki nodes in the set FSi would be large, and,
at the same time, the signed timestamps SUi(j) that node i would
receive from them would last for long time. This would surely
translate into a low number of false positives in our system (legit-
imate users that cannot authenticate). At the same time, however,
this would give more chances to the adversary to keep his certifi-
cate valid for a long period of time. Thus, by choosing the elements
of set FSi and the values of FIi we trade-off the ability of the sys-
tem to correctly authenticate honest nodes and the performance in
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Figure 5: Distribution of the sizes of the sets FSi
blocking outsiders.
Given these considerations, an intuitive choice is that of putting
in FSi the set of nodes that i is likely to encounter more often, and
in FIi( j) the expected inter contact times between i and each of the
nodes in FSi. To define FSi and FIi we again use the social behavior
of node i observed during the training period as an approximation
of the its behaviour the rest of the trace. To compute FSi set, we
first consider the set of nodes Si that i has seen at least once during
the training period. Then, for every node j ∈ Si we calculate the
number di j of days in which i met j, and compute the average value:
di =
1
|Si| ∑j∈Si
di j
Finally, we take as FSi the set of nodes j such that di j ≥ di. In
Figure 5 we show the distribution of the size of the sets FSi in all
the traces. For the Dartmouth trace (Figure 5(a)) the average size
of FSi is 26.4, for UCSD (Figure 5(b)) it is 9, for Reality (Figure
5(c)) it is 12.3 and for SWIM it is 24.3. It is worth to observe
that the sizes of the FSi sets don’t change much from trace to trace
despite the fact that in Dartmouth and SWIM the number of nodes
is more than 20 times bigger than that of UCSD and Reality. We
interpret this fact as an hint that our definition of FSi is meaningful
and rather stable.
The values in FIi are computed starting from the inter-contacts
observed between node i and the nodes in FSi during the training
period. More in detail, for every pair of nodes (i, j) we computed
FIi( j) as a the average number of days between contacts of nodes i
and j.
5.5.1 False Positives
First, we tested the system in order to know if the honest nodes
are always able to certificate their identity. We define a false pos-
itive as the event that a legitimate user is not able to authenticate
since he is temporarily out of his community for a long time. To
perform these tests for all the nodes we have set the value ki to 1
and run the simulation as if no attack happens. Setting ki to 1 means
that for a node it is sufficient to have just one valid signed update
to prove its identity. This permits us to study the lower bound of
the number of false positives the system can ensure given the defi-
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Figure 6: Distribution of the average community certificates
durations
nitions of FSi and FIi we provided above.
In the case of the Dartmouth trace, we have found that 43 nodes
(that is just the 4% of all the 1101 nodes) show false positives: 36
of them have only one false positive, while the rest have two false
positives. Moreover, the periods in which these nodes are not able
to prove their identity always lasts one day at most. Considering
the simple way in which we defined the sets FSi and the values FIi
these results are pretty good. In the case of the UCSD trace our
tests performed even better: only one node over the 32 we tested
(that is, the 3% of the nodes) has false positives. In particular the
node is not able to prove its identity only for three time intervals,
all of them lasting less than one day. We got a similar result in
the Reality trace too: only one node over 45 (2% of the nodes)
had false positives and this happened only twice and for less than
one day. Finally, in the SWIM trace no node has generated false
positives.
5.5.2 Certificates Duration
We have shown that the way we defined FSi and FIi is good
enough to ensure that only a very small percentage of honest nodes
suffers of false positives. Now it is time to study the effectiveness
of the Community Certificates sub-system in limiting the power of
a clone attack by an outsider. To do that, we study is the average
time it takes for the community certificate of the nodes to expire
in absence of contacts with nodes in the set FSi. This gives us a
measure of the amount of time the adversary is able to use a cloned
identity. The reason is that, once the adversary cloned an identity,
he/she won’t be able to use it inside the community of the victim or
to renew it withouth being quickly detected by the Personal Marks
sub-system. In such a situation, the only option left to the adversary
is that of using the identity far from the victim’s community.
When we studied the average duration of the community certifi-
cates, we used, for each node, the highest value ki for which the
node is not affected by false positives. This gives us an idea of how
much we can stress the system to get the lowest possible average
certificate duration given our definitions of FSi and FIi. The results
of our measurements are shown in Figure 6. Each graph shows, for
a given number of days x, what is the number of nodes whose cer-
tificate has, on average, a duration of more than x days when cloned
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Figure 7: Distribution of the values ki
by an outsiders. So, the faster the better. The first thing we can no-
tice is that in all the traces the average duration of the certificate is
never more than 2 or 3 days in the worst cases, and roughly between
0.5 and 1.5 in the majority of the cases. More in detail, in the Dart-
mouth trace (Figure 6(a)) the community certificate has an average
validity of less than one day and a half for 93% of the nodes, while
only 3% of the nodes have a certificate lasting, on average, more
than two days. In the UCSD trace (Figure 6(b)), the community
certificates last on average at most one day and a half for 84% of
the nodes. This value is slightly smaller than the corresponding one
found in the Dartmouth trace. However, in the worst case the aver-
age certificate duration in the UCSD trace is 2.6 days as compared
to the more than 3.5 days of the Dartmouth trace. In the case of
the Reality trace, the average certificate duration is at most one day
and a half for the 91% of the nodes and it is at most 1.62 days long
for all the nodes. This value is the minimum among the maximum
average certificate duration we measured in the three real traces we
have used. Finally the simulated trace SWIM shows very good per-
formance: 99% of the nodes have an average certificate duration
smaller than 1 day and the maximum average certificate duration is
1.78 days.
Figure 7 shows the distributions of the values ki that we have
found to be the maximum we could use on each node without gen-
erating false positives. As we can see, there is a big difference
between the optimal values found for the Dartmouth and SWIM
traces (Figures 7(a) and 7(d)) and those found in the Reality and
UCSD traces (Figures 7(c) and 7(b)). In the first two traces there
is a big number of nodes for which we have been able to select
(automatically from the training period) high values of ki without
producing false positives. For instance, in the Dartmouth trace, for
93% of the nodes we have been able to select a value ki greater than
1 and for 52% of the nodes a value greater than 11. In SWIM, the
sets FSi are generally smaller than those found in Dartmouth (see
Figure 5) and this translates into smaller values of ki. Nevertheless
in SWIM it is possible to set a value ki greater than 1 for 99% of
the nodes and a value greater than 10 for 42% of the nodes. On
the other hand, in UCSD and Reality we can use a ki greater than
one only for 19% and for the 37.7% of the nodes respectively. This
big difference can be explained by the fact that, as shown in Table
1, in Dartmouth and SWIM the nodes have a much higher number
of contacts than in UCSD and Reality. In the case of Dartmouth
this happens because the number of nodes is high and the trace
has been collected using WiFi data rather than a short ranged blue-
tooth radio. On the other hand, in SWIM, since we are simulating
a bluetooth trace, the nodes don’t have a range as high as that of
Dartmouth hence they tend to have contacts with smaller portions
of the network. However, as already stressed in the previous sec-
tions, using the SWIM simulator we never miss a contact between
two nodes and, moreover, we don’t have data losses typical of the
real traces.
Overall, we can say that the definitions we used for FSi and FS j
seem to work well in different scenarios. Indeed, they make it easy
to the large majority of the honest nodes to keep their community
certificates up to date. At the same time, the adversary that clones
an honest identity, will be able to use it for only short period of time
that is in the order of one or two days at most.
5.6 Using Fixed Infrastructure in the Commu-
nity Certificates
So far we have assumed that each node receives its signed times-
tamps from the other nodes in its community. However, the Com-
munity Certificates protocol is actually more general than that. In-
deed, the certificate authority may potentially put into the set FSi
the ID of any kind of device with a private/public key pair that is
able to send signed timestamps to the nodes that enter its range
of communication. For instance, we could think of a WiFi access
point in a university campus. In such a scenario it would be per-
fectly reasonable for a student to have stored in the set FSi of his/her
smartphone the public key of the access points of the university
buildings he/she frequents the most. There would be three good
reasons to do that. The first one is that there are locations, just like
friends, that we “meet” more often than others; it is easy to check
experimentally that the pattern of meetings is similar to that of two
nodes carried by humans. The second one is that the access points
have fixed locations and are, usually, always on. The third one is
that it is supposedly harder to tamper with an access point and to
move it to another location rather than a mobile device. This would
make it more difficult for the adversary to refresh the community
certificate of a cloned identity i by compromising a given number
of nodes in the set FSi (see Section 4.3).
For these reasons we found it interesting to test the performance
of Community Certificates in a situation where the certificate au-
thority puts in FSi the access points of the most frequented loca-
tions of each node. To do that, we used the Dartmouth and UCSD
traces since they have been collected exactly recording the associa-
tions between mobile nodes and the access point of the Dartmouth
and University of California San Diego campuses respectively (see
Section 5.1). We performed the tests with the same definitions of
FSi and FIi we used in Section 5.5, though, this time, we are inter-
ested in the contacts between nodes and access points rather than
between pair of nodes. The results are shown in Figures 8 and 9 .
The first difference we can notice between these results and the
previous ones is the change in the sizes of the sets FSi. In the case
of the Dartmouth trace (Figure 8(a)) the average size of FSi is now
only 3, while before it was 26. On the contrary, in the UCSD (Fig-
ure 9(a)) trace the size of the FSi increased from an average of 9
to an average of 18. This is a consequence of the fact that in Dart-
mouth the contacts between the nodes happened in a restricted set
of places, while, in UCSD, the nodes were generally more mobile.
Note that these values are small as compared to the total number
of access points, that is about 500 in both traces. The second dif-
ference is that the average certificate duration of the nodes slightly
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Figure 8: Dartmouth (Using Access Points)
increases with respect to our previous results (remember, however,
that in these experiments we have removed the mobile friends!). In
the case of Dartmouth (Figure 8(b)), the percentage of nodes whose
community certificate has an average validity of less than one day
has dropped from 54% to 46%. Also, the community certificates
have an average duration of less than 1.5 days for 85% of the nodes
while before it was for 93%. In the case of UCSD (Figure 9(b))
31% of the nodes have a community certificate lasting on average
less than one day (before it was 53%) while for 81% it lasts less
than one day and a half (was 84%). To summarize, the results are
not as good as with real mobile friends. However, they are good
enough to make it reasonable to complement the set FSi with a
small number of entities that are part of the fixed infrastructure.
This is not going to reduce the performance considerably and helps
build a stronger system against coordinate attacks to multiple mo-
bile nodes. Lastly, Figures 8(b) and 9(b) show distribution of the
values of ki.
6. ADD-ONS AND CAVEATS
Community Certificates can be complemented and extended in
such a way to design more sophisticated and complete versions.
Here we discuss a few of these add-ons.
Travelling.
If we travel, especially alone, our community certificate is going
to expire soon. While this is generally true, we can easily design a
few solutions: (i) The user can suspend the community checks on
the certificate during the travel; (ii) if we often travel between two
cities, like Rome and San Diego, the user can prepare two different
profiles, in the same certificate, that can be selected when changing
community. Of course, it is fundamental that these solutions can be
used only by the the legitimate owner by performing the burden-
some alternative authentication that is used in case of exceptional
events.
Complex patterns.
It is fairly easy to extend Community Certificates in such a way
that it is not enough to get k fresh signed timestamps from your
circle of friends. Rather, the certificate needs k1 fresh signed times-
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Figure 9: UCSD (Using Access Points)
tamps from one sub-community (for example your family) and k2
fresh signed timestamps from another sub-community (for exam-
ple your colleagues) to be valid. A community certificate like this
can easily be more efficient and more useful in particular situations.
For example when we need at least one signature from one of our
bosses to be able to perform critical operations. Or at least one sig-
nature from a fixed infrastructure in the building of our company,
for example.
Electronic handshakes.
In addition to standard physical contacts, Community Certifi-
cates can be extended to use electronic handshakes. Assume that,
when meeting a friend, you use a particular secure "handshake"
made with your devices (like bumping the two together, for exam-
ple). Handshakes can be used at the place of physical proximity.
In this way, contacts are more trustworthy, but, on the other hand,
they need human intervention and are much fewer in number. Al-
ternatively, handshakes could be used to exchange a stronger signed
timestamp. By using complex patterns, one or more of these hand-
shakes can be required to enable a higher level of authentication to
perform critical operations.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we introduce Personal Marks and Community Cer-
tificates. The fundamental idea of Community Certificates is that,
in networks of mobile people, authentication can be based on the
notion of community, and nodes can authenticate by showing that
they indeed meet the people that are part of their community. While
the social structure of these networks has been extensively used in
networking, to the best of our knowledge this is the first time that
this has been used as a biometric to authenticate device. We also
present Personal Marks, a way a community can use to protect itself
against insiders performing a clone attack. The combined used of
these mechanisms deliver an excellent protection of the social mo-
bile network against the clone attack. Indeed our experiments show
that the detection is always correct, and fast enough considered the
slow dynamics of the trace we have used. In any real system, we
believe that the much faster dynamics of meetings can help deliver
much faster detection times.
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